Ghana’s first review under its IMF Policy Coordination Instrument ended in a staff-level agreement on 5 November. The headline is encouraging. The fine print will determine whether the growth story succeeds or fails.
In May 2023, Ghana entered a US$3 billion, 39-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) at the bottom of a debt crisis. On 27 July 2026, the IMF Executive Board completed the sixth and final review, released a last US$371 million, and upgraded Ghana’s risk of debt distress from high to moderate, two years earlier than expected at programme approval. On the same day, the Board reviewed a new 36-month Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI), requested by the Ghanaian authorities.
The PCI is an unusual instrument because it comes with no money. It is a framework for sustained policy engagement with the Fund: commitments, targets and regular reviews, without a financing tranche to soften the discipline. Its payoff is credibility, which lowers financing costs and provides private capital a reason to commit. That makes the first review more than a routine check. It is the first test of whether Ghana can hold the line when the crisis has passed and the pressure to spend is rising.
An IMF team led by Ruben Atoyan met the authorities in Accra from 22 October to 4 November 2026. The staff-level agreement still needs approval from IMF Management and the Executive Board, which press reports expect in January 2027. The PCI provides no new financing.
The Fund’s verdict opened with a clear statement that macroeconomic stability is becoming entrenched. The evidence it cited:
Growth: real GDP grew 6.2% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, driven by investment, with 5.7% projected for the full year.
– Inflation: 5.5% in October, below the Bank of Ghana’s 8±2% target band (that is, under the 6% lower bound).
- Fiscal position: the primary surplus is on track for the end-year programme target, and public debt remains low after rapid declines in recent years.
- Programme performance: broadly satisfactory, with most quantitative targets for this review met.
– *Shock absorption: accumulated buffers allowed the authorities to partly absorb the external shock from the war in the Middle East.
- Structural reforms: the Fiscal Strategy Document was published, Parliament approved the new Cocoa Board Act, quarterly electricity tariff adjustments continued, and a comprehensive review of customs and excise legislation was completed ahead of schedule.
The review also found the soft spots:
- Reserves: foreign exchange reserves declined in recent months, prompting corrective action.
- Reforms still in progress: the Bank of Ghana’s liquidity management framework, the Integrated Tax Administration System (ITAS), operationalising the Fiscal Council, and the Fiscal Risk Statement.
- A missed deadline: publication of the audit of the ECG’s collection accounts is delayed.
- Risks: exposure to gold, cocoa and oil prices, geopolitical tension and tighter global financial conditions; significant domestic debt rollover needs; fiscal pressure from the energy, cocoa and gold sectors; and remaining financial sector weaknesses.
What the IMF recommends
In summary, the Fund’s statement identifies six key priorities:
- Rebuild reserves. Implment the corrective measures steadfastly: moving foreign exchange intermediation from the Bank of Ghana to GoldBod and enforcing the higher gold sale requirement for large-scale miners. Pair these with greater exchange rate flexibility.
- Keep monetary policy prudent, with stronger reserve buffers.
- Build a sinking fund to pay for maturing domestic debt.
- Finish the unfinished reforms on time,* including the ECG audit, the Fiscal Council, the Fiscal Risk Statement, ITAS and the liquidity framework.
- Deliver a disciplined 2027 Budget. The target is a primary surplus of 0.5% of GDP on a commitment basis, consistent with the PCI and supported by revenue measures Parliament approved in July. The space it creates should go to investment under the New Economy priorities, backed by rigorous project appraisal, competitive procurement and strict expenditure controls. Non-oil revenue is projected to rise further, helped by the customs and excise review, ITAS and electronic fiscal devices.
- Strengthen governance: adopt the Conduct of Public Officers Bill, publish the second National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Action Plan and improve oversight of state-owned enterprises.
My reading: entrenched, but not yet insured
Stability has been achieved. Insuring it is the unfinished business, and three tests show where the gap lies:
1. The external buffer. This is the weakest link in an otherwise strong story. Gross reserves fell from US$14.16 billion in March to US$12.94 billion in June and about US$11.1 billion by end of August or 4.2 months of import cover against 5.7 in March. Bank of Ghana data reported in late September showed a partial recovery to about US$12 billion. The IMF has separately disclosed that the central bank sold US$12.9 billion into the foreign exchange market in the year to May 2026, while its July staff report flagged losses equal to 1.5% of GDP on the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme.
Moving intermediation to GoldBod, which sold US$1.011 billion to banks in October and targets US$1.2 billion in November, changes whose balance sheet carries the load. It does not settle the underlying question of whether currency stability is being earned or bought.
Parliamentary critics have asked whether intervention is simply being relabelled intermediation. That is a fair question and the answer is transparency, not rebuttal. The mid-August pause in GoldBod exports also showed how much of the external position now rides on a single commodity.
2. Fiscal-rule credibility. The primary surplus is being deliberately eased, from 2.1% of GDP recently to a planned 1.5% in 2026 and 0.5% in 2027, while the legislated anchor of 45% debt-to-GDP by 2034 stays in place. This is a calibrated bet that freed-up space, spent well, will raise growth faster than it raises debt.
The bet pays off only with good project selection. It also depends on the institutions that tell us when it is going wrong. The Fiscal Council and the Fiscal Risk Statement are the early-warning system, and that is why their delay matters more than a line in a reform matrix suggests. The same logic applies to the ECG audit, since energy-sector losses are among the most familiar sources of fiscal slippage.
3. Monetary room. Inflation below the target band gives the Bank of Ghana room to support growth. With reserves under pressure, that room is conditional on the exchange rate. The Fund’s call for greater flexibility is a signal that the price should do more of the adjusting so that reserves do less.
Stability becomes growth when it changes private behaviour: firms commit to multi-year capital spending, banks lend long and foreign investors price Ghana as a normalising credit. That happens when stability looks institutional rather than personal or programme-dependent.
Recommendations
For policymakers
- Publish the reserves playbook. Release the rules, volumes and costs of FX intermediation each quarter, and set a reserve-accumulation path with explicit triggers for review. Credibility is cheaper than intervention.
- Widen the foreign exchange base beyond gold. Make the Cocoa Board Act work in practice and support non-gold exports and diaspora and capital-market inflows so that a gold price dip is not a currency event.
- Front-load the watchdog institutions. Operationalise the Fiscal Council, deliver the Fiscal Risk Statement, complete ITAS and publish the ECG audit before 2027 spending accelerates, not after.
- Gate the capital budget. Publish the project pipeline, apply independent appraisal before commitment, enforce competitive procurement and prevent arrears from rebuilding.
5. Start the sinking fund early. Smoothing domestic rollovers reduces refinancing risk and shields the banking system from sovereign-rollover shocks.
- Let monetary policy read both dials. Inflation says there is room; reserves say be careful. Communicate how the two are being weighed.
For banks and the private sector
The IMF named financial sector weaknesses as a live risk. The stability window is the time to repair balance sheets, price credit for productive investment rather than defaulting to sovereign paper and build the pipeline of bankable projects that the 2027 investment push will need.
Caveats
This is a staff-level agreement, not a Board decision. Figures come from the IMF’s end-of-mission statement and press reports; reserves numbers differ across reports because of dating and measurement, so treat them as indicative. The recommendations in the final section are my own reading of the review, not the Fund’s.
Conclusion
Ghana has moved from stabilisation to the harder phase: making stability hard to reverse. Growth of 6% with inflation near 5% is a good starting point, but it is still just a starting point. The countries that turn recovery into a durable growth path are the ones that spend the calm years building buffers and institutions. The first PCI review says Ghana is on that road, and it is just as clear about the potholes.
By Daniel Afari-Djan · 6 November 2026
